Most of my research focuses on beliefs. I am interested in what kind of beliefs individuals hold and why they hold them. More specifically, my work has been looking at how irrational agents revise their beliefs and come to their (epistemic) senses, so to speak.

While most of the debate on irrational phenomena (e.g. wishful thinking, akrasia, self-deception) has been focusing on the question of how we ‘backslide’, my work focuses on the overlooked phenomenon where agents abandon their irrational, albeit oftentimes comforting, beliefs for the price of a cold truth.

 

In my dissertation I examine the phenomenon of self-deception and develop an account of how individuals cease to be self-deceived. 

I'm also currently working on issues about group agency, self-control, and philosophy of food.

Papers

Self-Control in Action and Belief (with Sarah Stroud), currently under review.

Here we advance a transversal account of self-control that applies both to the domain of action and to the domain of belief.

Can Groups Be Self-Deceived? (with Éliot Litalien), in preparation.

We argue that a coherent account of group self-deception is problematic.

From Psychometrics to Ethics: A Moral Dilemma for Response Shift in Health-Related Quality of Life, in preparation.

This paper is the result of work I have done as member of a research project led by Eran Tal (McGill) on validity in psychometrics. Here I examine an ethical dilemma physicians face between testing patients' treatments' success and improving patients' health.

Mad About Food: A Defense of Gastronomic Realism, in preparation.

I defend the plausibility of gastronomic realism and examine the phenomenology of gastronomic realism in the specific case of Italians' strong reactions to bastardized cooking.